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While the crisis of statistics has made it to the headlines, that of mathematical
modelling hasn’t. Something can be learned comparing the two, and looking at
other instances of production of numbers.Sociology of quantification and post-
normal science can help.
While statistical and mathematical modelling share important features, they don’t seem to share
the same sense of crisis. Statisticians appear mired in an academic and mediatic debate where
even the concept of significance appears challenged, while more sedate tones prevail in the
various communities of mathematical modelling. This is perhaps because, unlike statistics,
mathematical modelling is not a discipline. It cannot discuss possible fixes in disciplinary fora
under the supervision of recognised leaders. It cannot issue authoritative statements of concern
from relevant institutions such as e.g., the American Statistical Association or the columns of
Nature.
Additionally the practice of modelling is spread among different fields, each characterised by
its own quality assurance procedures (see1 for references and discussion). Finally, being the
coalface of research, statistics is often blamed for the larger reproducibility crisis affecting sci-
entific production2.
Yet if statistics is coming to terms with methodological abuse and wicked incentives, it appears
legitimate to ask if something of the sort might be happening in the multiverse of mathematical
modelling. A recent work in this journal reviews common critiques of modelling practices, and
suggests—for model validation, to complement a data-driven with a participatory-based
approach, thus tackling the dichotomy of model representativeness—model usefulness3. We
offer here a commentary which takes statistics as a point of departure and comparison.
For a start, modelling is less amenable than statistics to structured remedies. A statistical
experiment in medicine or psychology can be pre-registered, to prevent changing the hypothesis
after the results are known. The preregistration of a modelling exercise before the model is coded
is unheard of, although without assessing model purpose one cannot judge its quality. For this
reason, while a rhetorical or ritual use of methods is lamented in statistics2, it is perhaps even
more frequent in modelling1. What is meant here by ritual is the going through the motions of a
scientific process of quantification while in fact producing vacuous numbers1.
All model-knowing is conditional on assumptions4. Techniques for model sensitivity and
uncertainty quantification can answer the question of what inference is conditional on what
assumption, helping users to understand the true worth of a model. This understanding is
identified in ref. 3 as a key ingredient of validation. Unfortunately, most modelling studies don’t
bother with a sensitivity analysis—or perform a poor one5. A possible reason is that a proper
appreciation of uncertainty may locate an output on the right side of Fig. 1, which is a reminder
of the important trade-off between model complexity and model error. Equivalent formulations
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of Fig. 1 can be seen in many fields of modelling and data ana-
lysis, and if the recommendations of the present comment should
be limited to one, it would be that a poster of Fig. 1 hangs in every
office where modelling takes place.
In modelling—as is the case of statistics, one can expect a mix
of technical and normative problems—the latter referring to
expectations, interests, values and policies being touched by the
modelling activity. In cost-benefit analyses an estimate of return
giving a range from a large loss to a large gain may not be what
the client wishes to hear. The analysts may be tempted to “adjust”
the uncertainty in the input until the output range is narrower
and conveniently located in friendlier territory. Integrated
climate-economy models pretend to show the fate of the planet
and its economy several decades ahead, while uncertainty is so
wide as to render any expectations for the future meaningless. In
economics, models universally known to be wrong continue to
play a role in economic policy decisions, while the neologism
‘mathiness’ has been proposed for the use of mathematics in
models to veil ideological stances. Disingenuous pricing of opa-
que financial products is held as partly responsible for the onset
of the last recession: modellers chose to calibrate the pricing of
bundles of mortgages based on data for the real estate market in
an up-swing period. Needless to say, these calibrations con-
veniently ignored what would happen when the market took a
turn for the worse. Transport policy offer a curious example
where a model requires as an input how many people will be
sitting in a car on average decades from now. See ref. 1 for the
references to the cases just described. More examples are
described in ref. 6, portraying flawed models used to justify
unwise policies in evaluation of fisheries’ stock, AIDS epidemics,
mill tailing, coastal erosion, and so on. Among those, studies for
the safety of an underground disposal of radioactive waste stand
out for providing what the authors in6 call “A million years of
certainty”, achieved thanks to a huge mathematical model
including 286 sub-models.
Modelling hubris may lead to “trans-science”, a practice which
lends itself to the language and formalism of science but where
science cannot provide answers7. Models may be used as a con-
venient tool of displacement – from what happens in reality to
what happens in the model8. The merging of algorithms with big
data blurs many existing distinctions among different instances of
quantification, leading to the question “what qualities are specific
to rankings, or indicators, or models, or algorithms?”9 Thus the
problems just highlighted are likely to apply to all of these
instances, as shown by the recent alarm about unethical use of
algorithms10, the disruptive use of artificial intelligence exem-
plified by Facebook, or the well documented problems with the
abuse of metrics11, which is now reflected in an increasing mili-
tancy against statistical and metrical abuses12.
This is not an indictment of mathematical modelling. Modelling
is essential to the scientific enterprise. When Steven Shapin, a
scholar studying science and technology, talks about “invisible
science”—meaning scientific and technological products which
improve our life—one chapter could be devoted to “invisible
models” underpinning these technologies. The malpractices allu-
ded to above are all different: not only a racist algorithm is dif-
ferent from an audacious cost-benefit analysis, or a low-powered
statistical study. Even within modelling, different problems are at
play. Modelling hubris has its counterpart in living in an idealised
model-land of appealing simplicity but scarce realism6.
Hence, recipes cannot be prescriptive or universal. The fol-
lowing could help (see ref. 1 for details):
● Memento Fig. 1.
● Mathematical modelling could benefit from structure and
standards based on statistical principles including a systemic
appraisal of model uncertainties and parametric sensitivities.
● Statistics could help by internalising these into its own syllabi
and practices.
● Models–including algorithms, should be made inherently
interpretable.
● For key models used in policy, peer review should be extended
to include auditing by an extended community involving a
plurality of disciplines and interested actors, leading to model
pedigrees, as discussed on this journal3 and more diffusely in
ref. 1.
● Audits could be used to uncover a model’s underlying,
unspoken, metaphors1.
To put the prescriptions into practice a movement of resistance
is needed, perhaps along the lines of the so-called statistical
activism12. This kind of resistance is familiar to scholars gathered
around post-normal science (PNS)13. The foundational
works14,15 of PNS’ fathers Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz
see model quality in terms of fitness for purpose. As noted in
ref. 3 this view—with would entail reconsidering the model any
time to see whether the purpose or the question put to the model
are changed—is still a minority view in the modelling commu-
nity. PNS suggests an approach to the use of models which is
more reflexive—i.e., the analyst is part of the analysis, and par-
ticipatory—including an extended peer community. While this
vision is gaining new traction3 more could be done. A new ethics
of quantification (https://www.uib.no/en/svt/127044/ethics-
quantification) must be nurtured, which takes inspiration from
a long tradition of sociology of numbers; Pierre Bourdieu12 and
Theodor Porter16 come to mind. What the authors in ref. 3 chose
to call the distinction between a positivistic and a relativistic
philosophy in model validation needs to be overcome for progress
to be achieved.
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Fig. 1 Model error as ideally resulting from the superposition of two curves:
(i) model inadequacy error, due to using too simple a model for the
problem at hand. This term goes down by making the model more complex;
(ii) error propagation, which results from the uncertainty in the input
variables propagating to the model output. This term grows with model
complexity. Whenever the system being modelled in not elementary,
overlooking important processes leaves us on the left-hand side of the plot,
while modelling hubris can take us to the right-hand side
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